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11 Introduction
Is the business cycle a real or a monetary phenomenon? The answer seemed clear after the
seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983), but only for a while.
Along side with some well known criticisms of standard RBC models, such as the lack of strong
propagation mechanisms, a serious challenge to the RBC paradigm is to explain ﬂuctuations in
nominal variables, such as the highly persistent inﬂation dynamics and its correlations with output.
A large literature has therefore emerged recently in general equilibrium modeling of the business
cycle with a renewed focus on stick price and money.1 At stake, among other things, is the issue
of monetary non-neutrality and what should be the appropriate conduct of monetary policy (see,
e.g., Goodfriend and King, 1997, for a comprehensive survey).
Ad e ﬁning feature of this recent literature is a more sophisticated way of modeling sticky price.
Based on early work of Taylor (1980), Calvo (1983) and others, this new literature attempts to
explain the business cycle from a monetary point of view by casting ﬁrms’ price setting decisions
within an explicit individual optimization framework. A chief success of this literature is the
theoretical derivation of the so-called “new Phillips curve” that links inﬂation to expected future
inﬂation and some measure of overall real activity, such as the marginal cost of production. The
empirical evidence so far appears to support the new Phillips curve (see, e.g., Robert, 1995; Gali
and Gertler, 1999) . Hence, progress seems have been made towards understanding the nature of
the business cycle beyond the real-business-cycle theory. Namely, the business cycle may be better
understood in models where monetary shocks and price setting behavior play a central role. Or is
it so?
Recently, Ireland (2003) estimates a sticky-price business cycle model with endogenous mon-
etary policy that nests the ﬂexible-price DSGE model as a special case (in this paper, “RBC”
model and “ﬂexible price DSGE” model are used interchangeably). Important ﬁndings include
that monetary shocks seem to have not played a signiﬁcant role in explaining the real side of
economic ﬂuctuations, and that the ﬂexible-price model does quite well in explaining some im-
portant features of the nominal business cycle. For example, Ireland ﬁnds that the ﬂexible price
model performs better than the sticky price model in explaining the volatility of inﬂation and the
degree of inﬂation persistence. But Ireland also ﬁnds evidence in support of the sticky price model,
1See e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), King and Watson (1996), King and Wolman (1996), and Yun (1996),
among others.
2especially with respect to the lead-lag relationship among output, inﬂation and interest rate.
This comment attempts to provide a theoretical analysis and explanation for Ireland’s (2003)
empirical ﬁndings. We show that sticky price is not the only way to derive the new Phillips
curve; the new Phillips curve can also be a consequence of endogenous monetary policy. In other
words, the new Phillips curve can also be derived from standard, ﬂexible-price DSGE models
where money is a veil but is endogenously determined by other economic variables. In this type of
models, it is the conduct of monetary policy — e.g., the Taylor rule — that gives rise to a relationship
linking current inﬂation to expected and lagged inﬂation as well as some measure of real activity.
We calibrate such an DSGE model and we show that with standard parameter values the model
can perform very well in explaining some important features of the nominal business cycle, which
includes not only the volatility of inﬂation relative to output and the degree of inﬂation persistence
(in consistence with Ireland, 2003), but also the lead-lag relationships among output, inﬂation and
interest rate (in sharp contrast to Ireland, 2003).
Because the structure of RBC models is well understood in the literature and it is much
simpler than that of sticky price models, we are able to reveal the precise conditions under which
a monetary model can generate persistent and hump-shaped inﬂation dynamics. Thus, we are
able to resolve a number of long standing puzzles in the sticky price literature. In particular, we
can explain: 1) why the aggregate price level is counter-cyclical; 2) why it is diﬃcult to generate
highly persistent or hump-shaped inﬂation dynamics under monetary shocks; and 3) why sticky
price does not help resolving the lack of propagation mechanism in standard RBC models.
Since by design money is neutral in our model, our analysis implies that not only in the long-
run but also in the short-run inﬂation can be purely a monetary phenomenon. Hence, the highly
persistent price movements and inﬂation dynamics may provide no additional clue for the nature
of the business cycle beyond what the real business cycle theory predicts. Our analysis supports
the view that monetary policies operating under the illusion that price is sticky (i.e., money has
real eﬀect) can produce price movements that appear to indicate price stickiness, although in fact
price is ﬂexible and money is completely neutral.
In this paper we also conduct a Monte Carlo analysis that may be of independent interest
to the literature. Many people have argued that monetary policy is endogenous. If money is
truly endogenous, or if money is completely neutral, then it is impossible to use VAR analysis
to identify the eﬀects of monetary shocks. But how come the existing literature often ﬁnds that
money shocks has real eﬀects?2 We conjecture that the empirical evidence may not be conclusive
2See e.g., Sims (1971, 1980, 1992), Christiano et al. (1995), and Strongin (1995).
3because the reported statistics is subject to large sampling, estimation, and identiﬁcation errors.
One of the most likely source of identiﬁcation error is the fact that there may be far more shocks
in the economy than the number of variables included in a typical VAR analysis. Hence each type
of identiﬁed shocks potentially reﬂects a group of other unobservable shocks, making the labeling
of these “identiﬁed” shocks highly misleading. To oﬀer an example supporting our conjecture,
we simulate our ﬂexible price DSGE model in which money is a veil, and we apply standard
econometric tools used in the literature to our model generated samples to identify the eﬀects
of the so called “monetary shocks”. We ﬁnd: 1) Using the Choleski decomposition (short run
restriction), negative shocks to nominal interest rate tend to increase output in a manner similar
to what is found in the data; and 2) Using the Blanchard-Quah (1989) decomposition (long-run
restriction), positive shocks to inﬂation rate tend to increase output in a manner similar to what is
found in the data. Although money is completely neutral in our model, but standard econometric
analysis based on the model generated ﬁnite samples tends to indicate monetary non-neutrality.3
Our work can also be viewed as related to the recent work of Benhabib et al. (2001), and Chari
et al. (2000). Benhabib et al. (2001) argue that endogenous monetary policy in the form of Taylor
rule can be dangerous in that it can lead to multiple equilibrium and expectations driven business
cycles. Hence endogenous policies can be destabilizing rather than stabilizing. Our ﬁnding is that
endogenous monetary policy can also be dangerous in that it can lead to inﬂation persistence, a
phenomenon that falsely indicates the existence of sticky price which monetary authority relies
on to justify the use of active monetary policy. This is another example where the intention of
monetary policy can be self-fulﬁlling: the very conduct of policy creates a phenomenon — the
illusion of sticky price — that is in turn used to justify the use of such policy.
Chari et al. (2000) show that sticky price by itself cannot enhance the propagation mechanism
of a DSGE model with respect to output ﬂuctuations.4 T h e i ra n a l y s i st h u ss u g g e s t st h a tr e a l
frictions are perhaps more important than nominal frictions in understanding the business cycle.
Our analysis reinforces the analysis of Chari et al. (2000). Here we show that sticky price is not
even necessary for understanding the nominal business cycle such as the price movements, since
it is entirely possible to construct a real business cycle model with endogenous monetary policy
to explain short-run inﬂation dynamics without resorting to sticky price.5
3We do not think our results on this issue are conclusive, but they do oﬀer some foods for thought.
4Also see Ball and Romer (1990).
5Using individual consumer prices, Bills and Klenow (2003) also ﬁnd that the joint hypothesis of sticky-price
models and popular monetary policy identiﬁcation schemes are rejected by the data.
42 The Basic Model
The model is a prototype DSGE model with money in the utility and Taylor rule, which is
a l s oas i m p l i ﬁed ﬂexible price version of the model studied by Ireland (2003). A representative
agent in this model chooses consumption (c), real money balance (M
p ), labor supply (n), savings






















Mt−1 + Tt + Bt−1
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where η denotes preference shocks (see e.g., Baxter and King, 1991), g government spending shocks,







































plus three market-clearing conditions for the goods market, the money market and the bond
market:
ct + gt + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt = Atkα
t n1−α
t , (6)
Mt = Mt−1 + Tt (7)
Bt = Bt−1 =0 . (8)
An endogenous monetary policy rule (the Taylor rule) is speciﬁed as:
logRt = δy logyt + δπ logπt +l o git (9)
where it is a policy shock variable. All shocks are assumed to follow AR(1) processes in log:
logηt =( 1 − ρη)¯ η + ρη logηt−1 + εηt
logAt =( 1 − ρη) ¯ A + ρa logAt−1 + εat
loggt =( 1 − ρη)¯ g + ρg loggt−1 + εgt
logit =( 1 − ρη)¯ i + ρi logit−1 + εit.
5Since money is a veil and the utility function is separable, this economy exhibits the classi-
cal feature of “dichotomy” in which a subset of equations (i.e., equations 1-3 plus equation 6)
determine the values of all real variables with the level of money supply playing no role in de-
termining the equilibrium value of any real variable. Hence the values of all real variables, such
as output, consumption, capital stock and employment, are determined by the real sectors in the
model economy (the labor and the goods markets), and the values of nominal variables are then
determined subsequently by the nominal sectors (the money and bond markets) and monetary
policy. For example, the nominal interest rate is determined by the Taylor rule (7), the inﬂation
rate is determined by the bond demand equation (5), and the endogenous money supply level is
determined by the money demand equation (4). Hence, the model has two parts, a “real” part
that behaves just like a RBC model without money (equations 1-3 plus 6) and a “nominal” part
that determines all the nominal variables once the real variable are determined.6
Notice that compared to Ireland (2003), we do not have adjustment costs in capital; and most
importantly we do not have intermediate goods and the associated monopolistic competition.
However, it can be shown that this model is equivalent to Ireland’s model with ﬂexible price. In
our model the real wage is given by w
p =( 1− α)
y
n. In Ireland’s model with ﬂexible price, the real
wage is given by w
p = mc(1 − α)
y
n, where the marginal cost (mc) is a constant that reﬂects the
level of markup.7 Hence, regarding log-linear dynamics, our model is equivalent to Ireland’s model
with ﬂexible price.
Since in this model all real variable behave exactly like they do in a RBC model, we can
represent the equilibrium of the real part of the model as a set of log-linear decision rules identical
to an RBC model (circumﬂex denote log-linearized values),

























where s is a vector of non-monetary state variables including capital (k) and other real shocks to
the economy (η,A,g), ε is a vector of innovations to the real shocks, z1 is a vector of non-monetary
ﬂow variables (such as output, consumption, real wage, real interest rate, and employment) that
is a function of the real state (s)o n l y ,a n dz2 is a vector of monetary ﬂow variables (such as price,
6Under the Cash-In-Advance constraint or none-separable utility function, money can have certain real eﬀect
even under ﬂexible prices, such as the inﬂation tax eﬀect (see e.g., Cooley and Hansen 19??). We choose to work
with a model where such eﬀects are completely absent in order to highlight our point and to present our argument
in a most stark environment.
7The marginal cost is no longer constant if price is sticky.
6inﬂation rate, nominal interest rate, real money demand) that is a function of both the real state
(s) and the nominal state (i.e., shocks to monetary policy, it). The “dichotomy” of the model is
reﬂected by that fact the coeﬃcient matrix for the ﬂow variables is lower triangular and the fact
that the real state variables (s) evolve separately from nominal state variables.
To derive the new Phillips curve, note that the log-linearized version of equation (5) and
equation (7) are given by
Et(ˆ λt+1 − ˆ λt)= ˆ Rt − Eˆ πt+1









where xt is a linear combination of real variables
n
ˆ λt+1, ˆ λt, ˆ yt
o
. Since in a RBC model all real








Thus, like the new Phillips curve derived from a typical sticky price model, here the current
inﬂation is linked to the expected future inﬂation and some measure of real activity, st.G i v e n
that δπ > 1 according to an active Taylor rule, we can iterate this equation forward to get
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where the state vector st is partitioned into capital stock (k) and a vector of real shocks (x), and
the coeﬃcients {φ1,φ2,φ3} are elasticities.
Therefore, it becomes clear at this point that inﬂation behaves either like the capital stock if φ1
is large, or like the exogenous shocks if the elements in φ2 or φ3 are large. Since in a standard RBC
model the capital stock is hump-shaped and the shocks are assumed to follow persistent AR(1)
processes, we can see the possibility for inﬂation rate to be either hump-shaped or persistent
AR(1) process. However, a hump-shaped inﬂation is possible only when the shocks originate from
real sectors in this model. To see this, note that monetary policy has no real eﬀect in this model,
7hence it has no eﬀect on the capital stock, consequently it is impossible for monetary policy shocks
(i) to generate hump-shaped impulse dynamics of inﬂation in this model. In other words, under
monetary policy shocks inﬂation behaves exactly like it since ˆ kt =0f o ra l lt. However, under
real shocks inﬂation may be hump-shaped if φ1 dominates φ2 so that inﬂation behaves like capital
stock.
Equation (10) has another interesting implication. Since in a standard RBC model the en-
dogenous state variable ˆ kt follows the equilibrium law of motion,
ˆ kt = φkkˆ kt−1 + φkxxt−1,



















Et−1ˆ πt + φπxxt +( φπkφkx − φπxφkk)xt−1. (11)
This is a second order diﬀerence equation in expected inﬂation, Et−1ˆ πt.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a to n e
of the roots of this equation lies outside the unit circle and the other lies inside the unit circle.
Hence solving the explosive root forward can give us the solution,
Et−1ˆ πt = ξππˆ πt−1 + ξπxxt−1,
where ξππ is the smaller root and is hence less than one in absolute value. Substituting this into
equation (11) gives
ˆ πt = ψ1ˆ πt−1 +
1
δπ
Etˆ πt+1 + φπxxt + ψ2xt−1, (12)












. Note that ψ1 > 0, since ξππ < 1,
δπ > 1, φkk > 0. Hence equation (12) looks very similar to the hybrid Phillips curve discussed by
Gali and Gertler (1999).
Notice that without the Taylor rule, then money supply is exogenous, hence the quantity
theory (money in the utility gives rise to a relationship between money and consumption similar
to the CIA constraint) implies that the price level is as persistent as output in this model under
real shocks. Since output in a standard RBC model behaves like exogenous shocks (see Cogley
and Nason, 1995; and Wen, 1995), price therefore follows an AR(1) process like output, hence
the inﬂation rate, as a ﬁrst diﬀerence of an AR(1) process (price), will have little persistence in
it. This shows that endogenous monetary policy is the chief culprit of inﬂation persistence in the
model.
83 Impulse Responses
This section examines the impulse responses of inﬂation and output to several shocks: tech-
nology shock, preference shock, government spending shock, and monetary policy shock. We show
that under either technology shocks or policy shocks, inﬂation is monotonic and negatively corre-
lated or uncorrelated with output, while under real demand shocks inﬂation can be hump-shaped
and positively correlated with output with lags. We calibrate the parameters as follows. We set
the time interval of the model as a quarter, the time discounting factor β =0 .99, the rate of capital
depreciation δ =0 .025, the capital elasticity of output α =0 .36, the inverse labor supply elasticity
parameter γ = 1, the steady-state government spending to output ratio
g
y =0 .2, the steady-state
consumption shock ratio
¯ η
c =0 .1, and the shock persistence parameters ρa = ρη = ρg = ρi =0 .9
(unless otherwise indicated). In setting the Taylor rule parameter, we set δπ =1 .35 and δy =0
(the broad pattern of the model’s dynamics is not sensitive to the coeﬃcients in the Taylor rule as
long as δπ > 1; we set δy = 0 since empirical studies, e.g., Gali and Gertler, 1999, and Ireland 2000,
typically ﬁnd δy to be very small; also, making δy 6= 0 has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on our results).8
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of output and inﬂation rate to a demand shock and a
technology shock respectively (since preference shocks and government spending shocks generate
exactly the same pattern of impulse responses, we report only the results for preference shocks
and technology shocks in Figure 1). It is seen in Figure 1 that inﬂation (upper right window) is
highly persistent and hump-shaped under real demand shocks, and it is inversely hump-shaped
under technology shocks (the lower right window). Under demand shocks (the top two windows),
inﬂation and output are positively (weakly) correlated contemporaneously, but with inﬂation lag-
ging output. Under technology shocks (the bottom two windows), inﬂation and output are nearly
negatively correlated with inﬂation leading output.
8Even when δy is relatively large, we are still able to generate almost exactly the same results by slightly adjusting
the other parameters in the model.
9Figure 1. Impulse Responses of Flexible Price Model.
Table 1 reports the standard deviation of inﬂation relative to output (second column), the
contemporaneous correlation of inﬂation with output, and the autocorrelations of output and
inﬂation respectively (the last two columns). It is seen that the model under either preference
shocks or government spending shocks matches the data quite well. In particular, similar to the
data, the model predicts that inﬂation and output are positively correlated contemporaneously,
and inﬂation is more persistent than output in terms of autocorrelations (the last two columns).9
The predicted volatility relative to output also matches the data well. Technology shocks, on the
other hand, cannot explain the positive correlation between inﬂation and output and the relative
volatility of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eU Sd a t a .
9Note that preference shocks and government shocks have exactly the same eﬀects.
10Table 1. Standard Moments of Output and Inﬂation (x = y,π)
σx σx/σy cor(xt,y t) cor(xt,x t−1) cor(xt,x t−2)
US Data∗∗
y 0.015 — — 0.85 0.65
π 0.006 0.41 0.09 0.90 0.85
Model
ηt y 0.015 — — 0.87 0.75
π 0.005 0.35 0.13 0.98 0.96
gt y 0.015 — — 0.87 0.75
π 0.005 0.35 0.13 0.98 0.96
at y 0.015 — — 0.92 0.85
π 0.0009 0.06 0.01 0.94 0.88
Model 2 (ηt)
(α =0 .2) y 0.015 — — 0.89 0.80
π 0.004 0.27 0.84 0.98 0.95
∗∗
The sample period is 1959:1 - 2003:4. Output is H-P detrended real GDP, inﬂation is percentage chang in GDP deﬂator.
Table 2 reports the lead-lag relationship between output and inﬂation. The lead-lag relation-
ship between inﬂation and output has been emphasized by Gali and Gertler (1999) as a key stylized
fact for the US economy which any monetary business cycle models must explain. The top row in
Table 2 shows that the US inﬂation rate is positively correlated with past output but negatively
correlated with future output, and inﬂation lags output about four quarters. The middle panel
in Table 2 shows that under real demand shocks the predicted inﬂa t i o ni nt h em o d e li sa l s op o s i -
tively correlated with past output and negatively correlated with future output; and the predicted
inﬂation also lags output by about four quarters. The model matches the data almost exactly for
the correlations of inﬂation with future output.10 On the other hand, under technology shocks the
model fails to mimic the cross correlation pattern of inﬂation and output found in the US data. In
particular, under technology shocks the predicted inﬂation leads output instead of lagging output.
10Note again that preference shocks and government shocks have exactly the same eﬀects.
11Table 2. Correlations of Inﬂation (πt) with Output (yt±j)
yt−4 yt−3 yt−2 yt−1 yt yt+1 yt+2 yt+3 yt+4
US Data∗∗
0.29 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.13 -0.20
Model
ηt 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.03 -0.06 -0.14 -0.20
gt 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.02 -0.06 -0.14 -0.20
at -0.40 -0.32 -0.22 -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Model 2 (ηt)
(α =0 .2) 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.53
∗∗
The sample period is 1959:1 - 2003:4. Output is H-P detrended real GDP, inﬂation is percentage chang in GDP deﬂator.
The reason for the model’s success in replicating the lead-lag pattern of US inﬂation and output
is clearly attributable to the fact that the model is able to generate highly persistent and hump-
shaped inﬂation under real demand shocks. The intuition for inﬂation being hump-shaped under
real demand shocks is as follows. Arbitrage between real assets (capital) and nominal assets (bond)
implies that the real interest rate (gross marginal product of capital, rt+1 ≡ 1−δ +∂yt+1/∂kt+1)
is related to the nominal rate and the expected inﬂation by
Etˆ rt+1 = ˆ Rt − Etˆ πt+1.









Thus, the current inﬂation is linked to expected future inﬂation and the real interest rate. Hence
the dynamics of inﬂation should mimic the dynamics of the real interest rate in the model. Figure
2 shows that the real interest rate in the model is hump-shaped under real demand shocks but
monotone-shaped under technology shocks. This explains why inﬂation is hump-shaped only when
the shocks are from real demand in the model.11
11By adjusting the parameter values of the model, the hump in the real interest rate and inﬂation rate can also be
adjusted either forward or backward, or the hump can even disappear. Thus the model is ﬂexible enough to explain
other possible types of inﬂation-output relationships that exhibit either larger lag, smaller lag, or no lag at all. For
example, across countries, some countries may exhibit stronger contemporaneous output-inﬂation correlations but
weaker leads in output, and some others exhibit weaker contemporaneous correlations but stronger leads in output.
The most crucial parameters in the model that control the hump-shaped real interest rate and inﬂation rate include
the capital elasticity of output (α) and the inverse labor supply elasticity parameter (γ). For example, as α or γ
12Figure 2. Impulse Responses of Inﬂation and Real Interest Rate.
Interestingly, there are strong empirical evidence supporting equation (13). Figure 3 shows
that the US real interest rate and inﬂation rate are highly correlated and they synchronize strongly
with each other at the business cycle frequency (8-40 quarters by band-pass ﬁlter). Given this
strong relationship between inﬂation and the real interest rate in the data as well as in the model, it
is not surprising that the model can match the data very well for the output-inﬂation relationship
if the major source of business cycle shocks is from real demand.12
increases the hump becomes larger, making inﬂation lag output more; conversely as α or γ decreases the hump
becomes smaller, making inﬂation to be more strongly correlated with output contemporaneously.
12T h er e a li n t e r e s tr a t ei sc o m p u t e da sn o m i n a lr a t em i n u sc u r r e n ti n ﬂation rate. The result does not change
signiﬁcantly if we use one-period ahead forecast of future inﬂation rate instead. Hence, we conjecture that similar
econometric analysis to that used by Gali and Gertler (1999) will fare equation (13) well by empirical data.
13Figure 3. U.S. Inﬂation and Real Interest Rate at Business Cycle Frequency.
Introducing stick price into the current model has little eﬀect on the dynamics of either output
or inﬂation respect to their responses to real shocks. For example, Figure 4 shows that the
volatilities of output, inﬂation and the real interest rate, as well as their cross correlations remain
virtually unchanged under all three types of real shocks when price is sticky.13 The only signiﬁcant
eﬀect of sticky price is that money shocks can now move output. However, the persistence of
output mimics the persistence of money shocks under sticky price, indicating that sticky price
does not enhance the internal propagation mechanisms of the model. Our results thus reinforce
the analysis of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) in that sticky price does not enhance RBC
model’s propagation mechanism under either real shocks or nominal shocks.14
13In the sticky price model the price-stickiness parameter is standard (θ =0 .75), implying that only θ fraction of
the ﬁrms can adjust their prices each period and that aggregate price is kept sticky for one year. Since government
spending shocks and preference shocks have similar eﬀects on output and inﬂation, only the impulse responses to
preference shocks are plotted.
14Chari et al. (2000) only show that sticky price has no eﬀect on the propagation mechanism of an RBC model
under nominal shocks. Here we show that this is also true for real shocks.
14Figure 4. Impulse Responses under Sticky Price.
Some of the results reported here appear to contradict part of Ireland’s (2000) empirical ﬁnd-
ings. According to Ireland (2003), with respect to output-inﬂation correlations, the sticky price
model does much better than the ﬂexible price model. This is not true here in our analysis. This
inconsistence is the consequence of the fact that Ireland (2003) has in his model a very low capital
elasticity of output in the production function (i.e., α =0 .2). When we set α =0 .2 in our model,
we also obtain result similar to that of Ireland; namely, the performance of the ﬂexible price
model deteriorates substantially with respect to output-inﬂation correlations. This is reported in
the lower panels in Table 1 and Table 2 under the title “Model 2”, where only preference shocks
(η) are considered to illustrate the point. It is seen there that the correct lead-lag relationship
between output and inﬂation disappears when α is too small.
4 Resolving the Counter-Cyclical Price Puzzle
According to traditional sticky-price Keynesian theory (e.g., the IS-LM model), aggregate price
level is expected to be procyclical when aggregate ﬂuctuations are driven primarily by aggregate
15demand. However, the observed aggregate price level is strongly counter-cyclical (see e.g., Kydland
and Prescott, 1990). This counter-cyclical price puzzle is related to the price reversal puzzle
documented by Sims (1992). Sims (1992) shows that in a typical VAR analysis for aggregate data,
price level is counter cyclical under interest rate shocks. Following an increase in the interest rate
(representing a monetary contraction) there is a substantial decline in output but a prolonged
increase in the price level. Sims (1992) argues that this puzzling phenomenon is inconsistent with
traditional IS-LM models.
Kydland and Prescott (1990) argue that counter-cyclical price movement is consistent with
ﬂexible price RBC models driven by technology shocks. Although technology shocks can generate
counter-cyclical price movements in a standard RBC model with money in the utility or under
the cash-in-advance constraint, they also generate counter-cyclical inﬂation dynamics, contrary
to what is observed in the data. When endogenous monetary policy is taken into consideration,
technology shocks then imply procyclical price movements, which is also inconsistent with the
data.
Here we show that if the main source of aggregate ﬂuctuations originates from aggregate
demand, then the observed counter-cyclical price movement is fully consistent with the prediction
of a ﬂexible price RBC model with endogenous monetary policy. The intuition is that under real
demand shocks, inﬂation is procyclical but it lags output, as discussed previously. Hence when
output enters the phase of a recession, inﬂation still remains positive, implying that the price
level is counter cyclical. This is shown in Figure 5, where the impulse responses of price level and
output to a preference shock are depicted. Government spending shocks also yield exactly the
same predictions for output and price level.15
15Based on the analysis, we suspect that the interest rate shocks identiﬁed by Sims (1992) may largely reﬂect
aggregate demand shocks, rather than monetary shocks. An interesting follow up work would be to replace the
nominal interest rate by consumption or government spending in the VARs used by Sims (1992).
16Figure 5. Impulse Responses of Price and Output.
Since the existing literature often documents the counter-cyclical price movements in the data
by applying either the H-P ﬁlter or the band-pass ﬁlter, we also report in Table 3 the second
moments of the US data and the model under both ﬁlters. The statistics of the model are based
on 500 simulations, each simulation generates output and price series with sample length of 140
observations (roughly the length of the data). Since for each round of the simulation, a full set of
moments can be computed, Table 3 reports the means of these moments based the 500 simulations.
Since government spending shocks have the same eﬀects as preference shocks on output and price
level, we report only the statistics based on preference shocks. The top panel in Table 3 shows
that in the US the volatility of price relative to GDP is around 0.6 regardless of the ﬁlter used, and
the price level is negatively correlated with output contemporaneously under both ﬁlters. This
negative correlation between price and output is intensiﬁed as we move towards future output (the
right side of the table) but it lightens and even becomes positive as we move towards the past (the
left side of the table), indicating that price level substantially lags GDP in the US such that it
appears to be counter cyclical. The bottom panel in Table 3 shows that the ﬂexible price model
predicts price volatility relative to output to be around 0.5 ∼ 0.7, which is consistent with the
data. Also, the model is able to predict the same pattern of price-output correlations under both
ﬁlters. This is not surprising given that the model is able to predict the inﬂation dynamics well.
What is surprising is the fact that real demand shocks can generate counter-cyclical price
17movement with respect to output when monetary policy is endogenous. Allowing for sticky price
in the model does not change these predictions. This is in sharp contrast to the predictions of
traditional IS-LM model where monetary policy is exogenous.
Table 3. Correlations of Price (pt) with Output (yt±j) under Demand Shocks
σp/σy yt−4 yt−3 yt−2 yt−1 yt yt+1 yt+2 yt+3 yt+4
US Data
H-P 0.57 0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.14 -0.28 -0.39 -0.49 -0.54 -0.53
B-P 0.60 0.04 -0.07 -0.19 -0.30 -0.40 -0.50 -0.54 -0.53 -0.46
Model∗∗
H-P 0.54 0.19 0.11 -0.00 -0.15 -0.33 -0.54 -0.64 -0.65 -0.61
(0.01) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
B-P 0.67 0.24 0.14 -0.00 -0.18 -0.37 -0.54 -0.66 -0.71 -0.69
(0.02) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
∗∗
The statistics of the model are the means of moments based on 500 simulations (sample length = 140). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
5 Identifying Real Eﬀects of “Monetary” Shocks
Although much empirical work has pointed out repeatedly that monetary shocks, compared
to real shocks such as shocks to consumption demand and technology, are not quantitatively
important in explaining output ﬂuctuations (see e.g., Cochrane, 1994, Leeper et al., 1996, and
Ireland, 2003), qualitatively speaking there do appear to exist evidence that money has real,
despite small, eﬀects on output in a way suggested by the standard Keynesian sticky price theory.
Therefore, an extensive literature has been developed to identify and document such eﬀects and
to explain why such eﬀects exist (see e.g., Sims, 1971, 1980, 1992; Christiano et al., 1995, 2003).
In this section we oﬀer a new interpretation to the literature’s empirical ﬁndings about the eﬀects
of monetary shocks.
In a typical VAR analysis, the number of variables included is very limited, often less than ﬁve.
But in the real world, the number of diﬀerent shocks is likely to far exceeds the number of variables
included in a typical VAR. Hence each identiﬁed shock in a VAR is likely to be a combination
of many other shocks. If this is the case, then the so called “monetary shocks” identiﬁed using
a ﬁnite variable VAR is likely to reﬂect a group of non-monetary shocks that may or may not
act like monetary shocks. Hence, even if monetary shocks have no real eﬀects, this identiﬁcation
18problem associated with VAR analysis could attribute eﬀects of other shocks to monetary shocks.
In what follows, we conduct a Monte Carlo analysis to illustrate this possibility. In the analysis
we generate ﬁnite samples of artiﬁcial data from the ﬂexible price RBC model and then apply
standard econometric tools to the samples to see if we are able to identify any real eﬀects of
monetary shocks (in the model money has no real eﬀects). We ﬁnd that real eﬀects of monetary
shocks do appear to exist in our artiﬁcial samples, although they are not signiﬁcant.
To make our point in a simplest way possible, we introduce three shocks in our model but we
use only two-variable VARs to identify the shocks. The procedure of our analysis is as follows.
We let the ﬂexible price model be subject to three types of shocks: a permanent technology
shock, a transitory AR(1) demand shock (to preference), and a transitory AR(1) money shock
to the Taylor rule. Due to the existence of the third shock, monetary policy is not completely
endogenous although it is completely neutral in the model. The parameters of the shock processes
are set as follows: ρa =1 .0, ρη =0 .9, ρi =0 .6, σa =0 .02, ση =1 , σi =0 .5. Since we are
simply trying to provide an example to illustrate our point, we do not calibrate these parameter
values according to independent empirical studies. We choose the sample length of each simulation
under independent draws of the three othorgonal shocks to be 140 quarters (roughly the US data
length), and we repeat our simulation for 500 times. For each round of the simulation, we collect
the samples for output, nominal interest rate, and inﬂation rate and we estimate a 2-variable VAR
for each sample as follows.16
First, we estimate a 2-variable VAR for output and nominal interest rate with output ordered
the ﬁrst in the VAR, and then use the lower-triangular Choleski decomposition to identify the
shock which has no contemporaneous eﬀect on output as a monetary shock (see e.g., Christiano
et al., 1995). We then compute the impulse response functions of output and interest rate to this
monetary shock. We repeat this estimation procedure for all the 500 samples and we obtain 500
estimated impulse response functions for output and interest rate respectively. Figure 6 graphs
the mean of the 500 estimated impulse response functions and the ±0.2 standard error bands
for output and interest rate.17 It shows that although the eﬀect of money shocks is small and
insigniﬁcant, but the sign of the responses of output to a decrease in the nominal interest rate
(representing a injection of money supply) is positive and hump-shaped. This is very similar to
the liquidity eﬀect the literature often ﬁnds in the US data (e.g., Christiano et al. 1995).
163l a g sa r ei n c l u d e di na l lt h eV A R s .
17Since the standard error is very large as expected, we multiply the one standard deviation by 0.1. The monetary
eﬀect is not signiﬁcant based on the two standard error bands.
19Figure 6. Impulse Responses to Interest Rate Shocks.
Second, we estimate a 2-variable VAR for output growth and inﬂa t i o nr a t e ,a n dt h e na p p l ya
long-run restriction (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) to identify the eﬀects of monetary police shocks.
Following the existing literature (e.g., Yun, 1996; Ellison and Scott, 2000), the shock which has no
long run eﬀect on output but may have long-run eﬀect on the price level is identiﬁed as monetary
shock, and the shock which has long-run eﬀect on output is identiﬁed as supply shock. The
impulse response function of output and inﬂation to money shock is estimated by the Blanchard-
Quah method for each sample generated, and this process is repeated for 500 times. Figure 7
graphs the mean and the ±0.5 standard error bands of the estimated impulse response functions
for output and inﬂation rate based on the 500 samples generated. It shows that the responses of
both output and inﬂation to the monetary shock are positive, indicating that money has positive
real eﬀects on output. This is also consistent with what the literature ﬁnds in the US data.
20Figure 7. Impulse Responses to Inﬂation Shocks.
Since the samples are generated from a model in which money has no real eﬀects, the apparent
positive eﬀects of money reported in ﬁgure 6 and ﬁgure 7 are clearly due to sampling and iden-
tiﬁcation errors. What is interesting, however, is that the estimated signs of monetary eﬀects on
output are all consistent with the implication of the sticky price model. The reason, we think, is
that the identiﬁed monetary shocks based on small samples are inﬂuenced by real demand and
supply shocks, because neither the Choleski restriction nor the Blanchard-Quah restriction can
eﬀectively distinguish real shocks from monetary shocks. In the ﬂexible price model a positive
preference shock raises output and inﬂation, while a positive technology shock raises output and
lowers nominal interest rate (because inﬂation rate decreases more than the real interest rate
rises). These eﬀects can not be unambiguously distinguished from monetary shocks in a ﬁnite
V A Rs y s t e mw h e nt h es a m p l es i z ei ss m a l l .A l t h o u g h our analysis on this issue is not conclusive,
but we think the results are suﬃciently interesting and suggestive to warrant further research and
scrutiny on this issue.
216 Inspecting the Propagation Mechanism of Monetary Shocks
It is now a well known fact in the literature that nominal rigidity does not help enhance RBC
model’s internal propagation mechanism (see e.g., Ball and Romer, 1992; and Chari et al., 2000).
But why this is the case is less clear in the literature. Since the structure of standard RBC models
is much simpler than that of standard sticky price models, this section tempts to shed light on this
issue by ﬁrst revealing the necessary conditions needed to enrich the weak propagation mechanism
of a standard RBC model, and then showing that sticky price does not meet the requirement of
these necessary conditions.
In a standard RBC model, the impact of shocks on output is propagated through capital
assimilation, because capital is the only endogenous state variable linking the current state to the
future state. Schematically, the propagation mechanism is given by
shock → Yt → It → Kt+1 → Yt+1 → ....
How long can the eﬀect of the initial shock be propagated is measured by how much it can aﬀect
the future output, Yt+1. This, however, depends crucially on how much eﬀe c ti th a so nt h ec u r r e n t
investment and hence the next period capital stock, Kt+1,a s s u m i n gaﬁxed labor for a moment.
When the rate of depreciation is small, then even if all the initial increase in output goes to
investment, the percentage change of capital stock in the next period is going to be minimal, since
capital is a stock variable and investment a ﬂow variable. A big change in a ﬂow variable can
hardly bring about an equally big change in the stock of the variable. To see this quantitatively,
log-linearize the law of motion for capital,
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It,
around a steady state, we have a relation linking the percentage change in capital to percentage
change in investment:
%Kt+1 =( 1− δ)%Kt + δ%It.
Hence, a one percent increase in investment can lead only to at most δ percent increase in the
capital stock. The rate of depreciation of capital is about 10 percent a year or δ =0 .025 in a
quarterly model, hence for each one percent initial increase in output can bring about at most
0.025 percent increase in the capital stock, which can increase output at most by 0.025 percent in
the next period, assuming a linear production function.
Hence in the absence of other production factors, no shocks can be eﬀectively transmitted to the
next period in a standard RBC model. However, even if there are other production factors, such
22as labor and capital utilization, the situation remains basically the same. These other production
factors can amplify the eﬀect of the shocks in the impact period through income or substitution
eﬀects. But in the subsequent periods, since the capital stock has changed little, the optimal
capital-labor ratio and other factor ratios will return back to the steady state. Hence they are not
able to contribute much to output in the subsequent periods. Thus, in order to generate persistent
movements in output, the shocks themselves must be highly persistent.
Clearly, in order to enrich the propagation mechanism of the model, we need to introduce new
state variables that are serially dependent. But unlike capital stock, these variables must be ﬂow
variables, such that any change in the current values of these variables can continue to bring large
changes in the future values of these variables. Furthermore, these new state variables must also
be able to directly inﬂuence the other factors of production (i.e., labor or capital utilization) so as
to impact on output. A good example is the dynamic employment adjustment cost model studied
by Wen (1995). In Wen’s model, lagged employment is a state variable and also a ﬂow variable.
In addition, employment enters directly into the production function. Hence any persistence in
employment due to adjustment costs can cause persistent movements in output.
Although the price level is not a stock variable and it can become a state variable in sticky
price models, it is however not closely linked to factors of production. In spite of sticky price,
the optimal factor ratios in standard sticky price models (e.g., Yun, 1996) are still determined by
their marginal products. This implies that sticky price per se does not aﬀect the relative factor
demand ratios. To see this, recall that the factor demand of labor and capital for a monopolistic









where {w,r,mc} denote the real wage, real interest rate and real marginal cost respectively. Firm’s
price setting behavior changes the dynamic behavior of the marginal cost by rendering the real
marginal cost a function of other variables in the model, instead of being a constant as in a ﬂexible







is independent of the marginal cost function (mc). Since market clearing in the labor market and
goods market equates the factor price ratio, w
r , to terms pertaining to marginal utilities, sticky
price thus has no eﬀect on the optimal factor ratios. If sticky price cannot cause stickiness in factor
23demand, then labor will return quickly to it steady state value after an initial shock if the capital
stock changes little in the subsequent period. Hence, unless the shocks are highly persistent, the
initial impact of a shock on output dies out quickly in the second period, regardless of price being
sticky or not.
The above analysis reveals that sticky price alone cannot change the basic propagation mecha-
nism of a DSGE model under either real shocks or monetary shocks. Sticky price can cause output
to move at the impact period under a money shock, but the propagation of the shock still relies
only on the channel of capital accumulation, not on price stickiness.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we try to provide a theoretical analysis on the issue of monetary non-neutrality in
light of the recent empirical ﬁnding of Ireland (2003) that ﬂexible price models are not necessarily
inferior to sticky price models in matching the data. We show that real demand shocks combined
with endogenous monetary policy is the key in explaining Ireland’s ﬁnding, since endogenous policy
can also give rise to the new Phillips curve that links the current inﬂation to expected future
inﬂation and some measure of real activity. As a consequence of endogenous monetary policy, a
standard ﬂexible price DSGE model in which money is a veil has the potential to fully explain
the short-run inﬂation dynamics without relying on sticky price. Since the structure of RBC
models is simpler than that of sticky price models, we are able to reveal the precise mechanisms
through which real shocks aﬀect inﬂation and output and explain why sticky price is not eﬀective
in enhancing RBC models’ propagation mechanisms. We also conduct Monte Carlo analysis to
show that the so called monetary non-neutrality identiﬁed in the empirical literature could be
due to estimation and identiﬁcation errors based on ﬁnite samples and ﬁnite variable VARs.
An implication of our analysis is that endogenous monetary policy could be far more important
than monetary shocks in shaping the dynamic behavior of key macroeconomic variables in actual
economies. This point has also been emphasized by previous authors, such as King and Plosser
(1984), Sims (1992), Leeper et al. (1996), and McCallum (2001), among many others.
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